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Introduction
Since 2014, the constitutional future of the United 
Kingdom (UK) has been in a state of almost perma-
nent flux. In the space of two years, the Scottish 
electorate went twice to the polls to vote on referen-
da on hugely significant constitutional issues. On 18 
September 2014, a record number of voters (circa 
85%) voted in an independence referendum in which 
55% of the electorate voted ‘no’ to the question 
‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ 
Almost two years later, the Scots were at the polls 
again, this time for a state-wide referendum on the 
UK’s continued membership of the European Union 
(EU). In this referendum, 62% of voters in Scotland 
voted to remain in the EU. However, the Scottish 
vote to remain was trumped by the overall UK-wide 
result in which just under 52% of the electorate 
chose to leave the EU. As has been pointed out 
elsewhere, ‘Brexit was made in England’.1
No sooner had the UK Government fired the starting 
gun on its lengthy and complicated negotiations to 
secure the UK’s exit from the EU than the Scottish 
Government called for a second referendum on 
Scottish independence. In Wales, Labour and Plaid 
Cymru worked together to produce a co-authored 
White Paper calling for continued membership of 
the European Single Market, while Sinn Fein’s 
strong performance in the March 2016 Stormont 
elections and the 2020 Irish elections has increased 
focus on a border poll on Irish reunification. Added 
to these conflicting and at times diametrically 
opposing visions for the constitutional future of 
Scotland and the UK, both countries find them-
selves at a constitutional crossroads: In leaving one 
union, the future of the other remains in the 
balance. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview 
of the constitutional debate in the UK vis-à-vis Scot-
land and the future of the UK union. We take stock of 
this debate in the post-referendum period, and look 
at what next for Scotland in the light of the Scottish 
government’s push for a second independence 
referendum. 
Brexit: Results and Reaction
On 23 June 2016, 43 years after joining what was then 
the European Community, the UK electorate, 
belying the predictions of polls and politicians, 
voted to end its membership of the EU. The differing 
results from England, Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland (see Figure One) in which the latter two 
voted to remain, while the former two voted to 
leave, underline the political divisions that have 
become evident in the UK since the introduction of 
devolution. Since 2007, Scotland has three times 
elected a nationalist government, most recently in 
2016 when the SNP lost its majority, winning two 
seats short of the required 65, but increased its 
share of the vote and became the first party ever to 
win over one million votes on the first ballot.2 Since 
2015, SNP support in UK general elections has 
fluctuated. In 2015, just one year after the independ-
ence referendum defeat, the SNP secured all but 3 
seats across Scotland, with an all-time high of 56 (of 
59) seats. In the 2017 snap election, the SNP 
remained the largest party across Scotland, but lost 
21 seats, including 12 to the pro-union Conservative 
party. However, in the December 2019 general 
election, the SNP regained some of the lost seats 
(winning 48 seats) and cemented once again its 
status as the biggest party in Scotland, and the third 
biggest party in the UK Parliament. 
Source: Own elaboration, based on data from The 
Electoral Commission.3
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 In her first speech after becoming Prime Minister in 
July 2016, Theresa May sought to emphasise the 
importance of the Union and ‘precious bond’ 
between the devolved nations of the UK.4 Her 
successor, Boris Johnson (who came to power in July 
2019), has adopted a similar rhetoric.5 What we have 
seen from both May and Johnson is a discourse 
focused on inclusive politics and a Brexit-deal that 
would be good for the whole UK, while in practice 
this rhetoric has not been met with the same politi-
cal actions. Instead, institutions such as the Joint 
Ministerial Committee (JMC) on EU negotiations, 
established to coordinate a joint Brexit response 
between the UK government and the devolved 
administrations, have been wholly dominated by 
the UK government’s uncompromising Brexit vision. 
The devolved administrations, and in particular the 
Scottish government, consistently complained that 
irrespective of JMC meetings, their views and 
concerns are superseded by the priorities and Brex-
it-stance of the UK government.6
 
The inability of the UK Parliament to find a way 
forward on Brexit once Theresa May’s government 
lost its majority in June 2017 was a further indication 
of the deep divisions over Brexit within UK politics. 
The SNP has predominantly voted against plans to 
move forward with Brexit, instead supporting and 
putting forward proposals on a second Brexit 
referendum, as well as the suspension of Article 50. 
The election of Boris Johnson as the new leader of 
the Conservative Party, and as Prime Minister in July 
2019 is a direct result of this impasse. Yet, a clear 
route out of the Brexit quagmire with cross-party 
support in Parliament did not ensue. Instead, John-
son’s polarising style resulted in the defection of 
several Conservative MPs and a further escalation 
of these deep divisions. The debate over Brexit was 
only resolved when new elections took place in 
December 2019, in which Johnson won an over-
whelming majority, thereby somewhat marginalis-
ing opposition from others within Parliament and 
the devolved administrations. As a result, the UK 
left the EU on the 31st of January 2020. Consequent-
ly, and unsurprisingly, the Scottish government 
became much more vociferous in calling for a 
second independence referendum.  
The Constitutional Crossroads: What Next for 
Scotland?
The results of the Brexit vote have exposed the deep 
political divisions in the UK, primarily in relation to 
territorial politics and constitutional visions. The 
Scottish Government, despite remaining committed 
to independence, sought to fashion a compromise 
solution in which the national interests and demo-
cratic wishes of the Scottish electorate could be 
protected. Its strategy paper, Scotland’s Place in 
Europe, published in 2016, was billed as such a com-
promise, one which laid out several options which 
would either ensure continued membership of the 
Single Market for the UK as a whole, or Scotland 
alone.7 This was further illuminated by Scottish First 
Minister Nicola Sturgeon’s announcement that she 
would take calls for a second independence referen-
dum off the table in return for a ‘soft Brexit’, that is 
membership of the European Single Market.8 The 
announcement, therefore, that leaving the Single 
Market was the preferred option of the UK Govern-
ment, merely emboldened the SNP’s position on a 
second independence referendum. Notwithstand-
ing this, the Supreme Court’s ruling that the 
devolved administrations did not need to be legally 
consulted before the triggering of Article 50 reignit-
ed debates regarding the constitutional and legal 
status of the devolved parliaments. 
In the absence of a UK-wide strategy for Brexit or 
any progress on securing a bespoke arrangement for 
Scotland, the Scottish government has continued to 
pursue calls for a second independence referen-
dum.9 Despite support in the Scottish Parliament to 
hold another referendum (69 MSPs from 129), both 
Theresa May and Boris Johnson have rebuffed calls 
for another independence poll. As the Constitution 
is a reserved power for the Westminster Parliament, 
it is not considered within the competence jurisdic-
tion of the Scottish Parliament to hold a referendum 
on independence, albeit this issue has not yet been 
decisively settled. The Scottish Government has 
called for this power to be devolved, but hitherto 
this has fallen on deaf ears. This leaves the Scottish 
Government with several (limited) options on how 
to move forward in the debate on independence. 
First, Nicola Sturgeon can continue the dialogue 
with Westminster and hope that opinion shifts 
within the Johnson government on a second inde-
pendence referendum. Currently there is no indica-
tion that this might occur, but in 2021 voters will 
elect a new Scottish Parliament, and an overwhelm-
ing victory for the SNP is likely to be used to put 
additional pressure on the UK government to agree 
a second independence referendum. The advantage 
of this option is that it remains within legal means. 
It is the preferred option of Sturgeon and is 
designed to acquiesce the demands of even the 
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most impatient pro-independence supporters. 
There are, however, several caveats to this position. 
While the SNP is on course to secure a fourth 
electoral victory in the 2021 election, it is unlikely to 
repeat its 2011 feat which cemented the decision of 
David Cameron to negotiate on a referendum. The 
Scottish Parliament’s mixed member proportional 
system is designed to prevent one party majorities, 
making an absolute majority for the SNP alone a 
difficult but not impossible task. Combining the 
numbers of SNP parliamentarians with those of the 
Scottish Greens (the only other party in the legisla-
ture that supports independence) may result in a 
pro-independence majority of MSPs, but this is not 
guaranteed to lead to a change of opinion in the UK 
government.
 
Second, there are some dissenting calls from within 
the SNP to consider a ‘wildcat’ Catalonia-style 
unilateral referendum.10 Supporters of this position 
believe the Scottish Parliament, notwithstanding 
the refusal of the UK government to transfer the 
necessary legal power to do so, should legislate on a 
second independence referendum to end the current 
stalemate on the issue. Such a bold move, however, 
has been firmly reject by the Scottish First Minister.11 
This, it seems, is a wise move considering the ongo-
ing impasse in Catalan-Spanish relations12 and the 
sobering reality that an ‘illegal’ referendum would 
almost certainly result in a unionist boycott (as was 
the case in Catalonia) and therefore do very little to 
attract voters who voted ‘no’ in 2014. Preference is 
for a legal and fair referendum as was agreed for 
2014, but voices are growing in favour of a more 
unilateral approach. 
Third, albeit somewhat linked with the above, is the 
option of a legal showdown in the Courts.13 Intrigu-
ingly, and contrary to most other multilevel states, 
litigation on constitutional matters has been an 
almost completely absent feature of UK territorial 
politics. In fact, it was not until the Brexit debate 
that the Courts came to play an important role in 
constitutional debates. A court battle between the 
UK and Scottish governments has been described by 
Sturgeon as a measure of last resort, not least 
because the ‘outcome would be uncertain’, but has 
not been ruled out as a future strategy in order to 
challenge the UK government’s intransigent 
position.14 Those in favour of unilateral legislation 
for a second independence referendum somewhat 
align with this position, believing that the legisla-
tion would be challenged in the Courts and thus 
would facilitate movement on the issue.15 A court 
battle may have some political mileage for the SNP 
among its supporters but is unlikely to result in the 
legal victory the SNP desires. 
Finally, there is also the possibility of the SNP losing 
support in the 2021 election, in which case its quest 
for a second referendum would be undermined. As 
discussed above, the 2017 general election high-
lighted that the polarisation of voters around 
constitutional issues has not proved beneficial for 
the SNP. There is currently no substantial increase 
in support for independence recognisable across 
opinion polls in recent months, and a further focus 
on this issue might lead to voters turning their backs 
on the SNP. Current polling shows, however, that 
the SNP remains significantly ahead of other 
parties, in some surveys with a 20-point lead, 
suggesting the party is on course for a fourth 
electoral victory in the 2021 election.16 As was the 
case with the SNP’s previous electoral victories, this 
does not mean the case for independence will have 
been won; the party still needs to win over previous 
‘no’ voters to secure an affirmative referendum 
result. A vote for the SNP does not translate to a 
vote for independence.
 
The result of this ongoing quagmire in British 
politics is a deepening constitutional crisis. While 
the Scottish Government’s call for a second referen-
dum remains unheeded it seems to be a question of 
when rather than if another independence referen-
dum takes place. Yet, even though it may seem likely 
that such a vote will take place, when this is held, or 
indeed, what the result will be, is far from clear. 
Conclusion
Devolution to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 
has fundamentally changed the constitutional land-
scape of the UK. Since 1997, successive British 
governments have taken an ad-hoc, piecemeal 
approach to constitutional and territorial politics in 
the UK and while it remains clear that such tinkering 
has transformed the UK’s constitutional architec-
ture, its impact on the Union remains contested. 
Devolution has not led to the disintegration of the 
UK, but the rise of the SNP and the increasing prom-
inence of the constitutional question, has meant 
that British politics is far from business as usual. The 
differing results of the Brexit vote in England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland underline the 
distinct political cultures that continue to evolve in 
each of these nations, and furthermore illuminate 
the development of very different and at times 
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diametrically opposing political and constitutional 
visions. It is not yet clear what the final impact of EU 
withdrawal will be on the UK, and in particular on 
Scotland. While it is a truism that the secession of 
Scotland is not inevitable, there is nothing guaran-
teed about the future constitutional integrity of the 
UK. The tectonic plates of British politics are once 
again shifting, and the UK’s once strong and stable 
constitutional edifice is beginning to crack.
* Paul Anderson is Lecturer in Politics and Internation-
al Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. 
His principal research areas include territorial autonomy, 
secessionist movements and conflict resolution. 
* Soeren Keil is Reader in Politics and International 
Relations at Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. 
His research focuses on federalism and conflict resolu-
tion, the western Balkans and European Union politics.
References:
1 Henderson, A., Jeffery, C., Wincott, D. and Wyn 
Jones, R. ‘How Brexit was made in England’, The 
British Journal of Politics and International Rela-
tions, 19:4, pp. 631-646. 
2 Anderson, P. 2016. ’The 2016 Scottish Parliament 
Election: a nationalist minority, a Conservative 
comeback and a Labour collapse’, Regional and 
Federal Studies, 26:4, pp. 555-568. 
3  Electoral Commission. 2017. Results and turnout 
at the Eu referendum. 
4 May, T. 2016. ‘Statement from the new Prime 
Minister Theresa May’ 13 July. London.  
5 Johnson, B. 2019. Boris Johnson Conservative Party 
Conference Speech 2019. 2 October. Manchester. 
6 BBC News. 2017. ‘Sturgeon: Coming weeks ‘really 
critical’ for UK on Brexit’. 30 January. Available at: 
7 Scottish Government. 2016. Scotland’s Place in 
Europe. Edinburgh: Scottish Government.  
8 BBC News. 2017. ‘Sturgeon suggests soft Brexit 
could take indyref off table in short term’. 6 January. 
9 Sturgeon, N. 2017. ‘First Minister Speech’. 13 
March. Edinburgh.
10 Herald Scotland Online. 2020. ’Don’t rule out 
wildcat Scottish independence referendum –Mhairi 
Black’. The Herald. 26 January. 
11 Sturgeon, N. 2019. SNP Conference Speech. 15 
October. Aberdeen. 
12  Anderson, P. (forthcoming). ‘Decentralisation at 
a Crossroads: Spain, Catalonia and the Territorial 
Crisis’. Ethnopolitics. 
13 Cherry, J. 2020. ’It’s time to take out fight for inde-
pendence to the courts’ The Times. 28 February. 
14 Scott McNab. 2020. ’Nicola Sturgeon may move 
to hold indyref2 without UK Government’. The 
Scotsman. 31 January.
15 Kieran Andrews. 2020. ’Test the waters on Scot-
tish independence powers, Joanna Cherry urges law 
chief’. The Times. 28 February. 
16 What Scotland Thinks. 2020. Available at: 
https://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how- 
would-you-use-your-constituency-vote-in-a-scot-
tish-parliament-election-aske/
  
Policy Paper
Note de recherche
Centre international
de formation européenne
4
Rédaction: Aline Palige et Jean-Claude Vérez
Policy Paper / Note de recherche est publiée par le 
Centre international de formation européenne, association dont le 
siège est 81, rue de France, F-06000-Nice.
© CIFE 2020, tous droits réservés pour tous pays. 
www.cife.eu
Ce projet a été financé avec le soutien de la Commission européenne. 
Cette publication (communication) n’engage que son auteur et la 
Commission n’est pas responsable de l’usage qui pourrait être fait des 
informations qui y sont contenues.
                Avec le soutien du programme Erasmus+
